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The False Promise of the Converse-1983 Action 
JOHN F. PREIS∗ 
The federal government is out of control. At least that’s what many states will 
tell you. Not only is the federal government passing patently unconstitutional 
legislation, but its street-level officers are ignoring citizens’ constitutional rights. 
How can states stop this federal juggernaut? Many are advocating a “repeal 
amendment,” whereby two-thirds of the states could vote to repeal federal 
legislation. But the repeal amendment will only address unconstitutional 
legislation, not unconstitutional actions. States can’t repeal a stop-and-frisk that 
occurred last Thursday. States might, however, enact a so-called “converse-1983” 
action. The idea for converse-1983 laws has been around for some time but until 
now has escaped academic treatment. 
A converse-1983 action would operate similarly to the popular § 1983 action in 
that it would provide a cause of action for damages where federal constitutional 
rights have been violated. Unlike § 1983, however, a converse-1983 would be 
enacted by a state (rather than Congress) and provide a cause of action against a 
federal officer (rather than a state officer). By enacting converse-1983 laws, states 
could thus punish the federal government when its officers disregard the 
Constitution.  
The problem with converse-1983 laws, however, is that they just won’t work. In 
this Article, I explain that converse-1983 laws will always be subject to limitations 
imposed by Congress or the federal courts. It can hardly be said that 
converse-1983 laws are a valuable opportunity for states to rein in the federal 
government if those laws can only be enforced at the pleasure of the federal 
government. In making this argument, I take the reader on a tour of a variety of 
topics in the field of constitutional enforcement, including officer immunity, federal 
common law, the nature of Bivens actions, the constitutional right to a remedy, and 
Founding-era practices through which states imposed their views on the federal 
government. Together, these discussions make clear that the converse-1983 action, 
which has been often cited but rarely questioned, is a cause of action without any 
legal value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The states have had it up to here with the federal government. While the states 
are trying to fill potholes and keep the schools open, the Feds are trying to get 
everybody to quit smoking pot1 and buy health insurance.2 It’s worse than that, of 
course. The FBI is infiltrating local houses of worship,3 the CIA is making people 
disappear,4 the NSA is tapping phones,5 and the TSA is demanding grandmas pose 
in the nude.6 Next thing you know, we’ll all be forced to drive Chevy trucks.7 
What’s a state to do? Secession is probably too radical,8 and an armed revolt can 
be messy.9 A somewhat more realistic option is a constitutional amendment giving 
two-thirds of the states the option of repealing federal legislation—the so-called 
“repeal amendment.”10 But constitutional amendments are long shots, and the 
repeal amendment would only provide states with the power to nullify 
unconstitutional legislation. Most constitutional violations committed by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the federal bar on marijuana 
use for medical purposes was constitutional). 
 2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 
Stat. 119, 242–44 (2010) (requiring nearly every U.S. citizen to maintain a minimum level of 
health insurance starting in 2014). 
 3. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Tension Grows Between Calif. Muslims, FBI After 
Informant Infiltrates Mosque, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403710_pf.html.  
 4. See e.g., David Johnston, Rendition to Continue, but with Better Oversight, U.S. 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at A8.  
 5. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.  
 6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The TSA Is Invasive, Annoying - and Unconstitutional, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2010, at B1.  
 7. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining that, if Congress can make Americans buy health 
insurance, Congress could also “require that everyone above a certain income threshold buy 
a General Motors automobile”). 
 8. See Hilary Hylton, What’s All That Secession Ruckus in Texas?, TIME, Apr. 18, 
2009, at 32 (“While crowds yelled ‘Secede! Secede!,’ [Texas Governor Rick] Perry . . . 
thought out loud that secession might be the outcome if Washington does not mend its 
‘oppressive’ high-spending, dictatorial ways.”). 
 9. See Greg Sargent, Sharron Angle Floated Possibility of Armed Insurrection, WASH. 
POST (June 15, 2010, 1:32 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-
line/2010/06/sharron_angle_floated_possibil.html (reporting U.S. Senate candidate Sharron 
Angle’s exhortation that citizens “look[] toward those Second Amendment remedies” to 
fight the expansion of federal power). 
 10. See Randy E. Barnett & William J. Howell, The Case for a ‘Repeal Amendment,’ 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2010, at A23. 
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federal government are not products of the bicameral process.11 They are simply 
products of everyday interactions between citizens and federal law enforcement 
officers. Persons are searched, seized, and beaten. They are denied equality and due 
process. If states want to protect their citizens from these harms, the repeal 
amendment will be useless. You can’t repeal a stop-and-frisk that occurred last 
Thursday. So again, what’s a state to do?  
Perhaps the states should take a cue from the federal government itself. In the 
aftermath of the Civil War, the federal government faced the same sort of problem. 
Southern states were failing to enforce the constitutional rights of their new 
citizens, the former slaves, and most of the violations were not in the form of 
statutes that were unconstitutional, but rather in the form of discretionary officer 
action.12 In response to this nonstatutory disobedience, the federal government 
enacted the Ku Klux Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13 The statute did not 
provide southern citizens with new rights; it simply provided them with a cause of 
action for enforcing the constitutional rights they already possessed. Under § 1983, 
if a local sheriff violates your constitutional rights, you can sue him for damages. 
Given the modern success of § 1983 in state-level reform,14 the states might 
enact a “converse-1983” law to achieve federal-level reform. Just as the current 
§ 1983 provides a federal cause of action against state officers, a converse-1983 
law would provide a state cause of action against federal officers who have 
violated the federal Constitution. Under these laws, federal officers who tap phones 
or whisk citizens away to secret locations could be sued for constitutional 
damages—regardless of whether the federal government has provided a cause of 
action.  
The idea is not new. Professor Akhil Reed Amar proposed such a law many 
years ago15 and modern commentators continue to cite the idea with only 
occasional skepticism.16 Professor Amar’s argument in favor of converse-1983 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A 
Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 427 (1997) (explaining 
that the bulk of judicial review in the federal courts is of decisions by “administrative 
agencies and street-level bureaucrats,” not of congressional statutes).  
 12. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 
425–44 (1988). 
 13. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
 14. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, MICHAEL L. WELLS, & THOMAS A. EATON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 1 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the “considerable practical significance” 
of § 1983 suits).  
 15. Professor Amar originally proposed the idea in Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty 
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1512–19 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Sovereignty and 
Federalism]. Thereafter, he defended the idea in Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of 
Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, 
Five Views] and in Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional 
Rights: Some Questions and Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1993) 
[hereinafter Amar, Questions and Answers]. He has also advanced the idea in passing in 
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 117 
(2000) (defending the “the right of states to arm citizens with remedies against the federal 
government when the feds violate the Constitution”). 
 16. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Converse § 1983 Suits in Which States Police 
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actions is largely built on a conception of federalism he traces to the Federalist 
Papers.17 There, James Madison explained that, under the new Constitution, the 
“rights of the people” will be guarded by two governments, not just one.18 The state 
and federal governments “will controul each other.”19 Converse-1983 laws would 
seem to be the perfect expression of the state prerogative to control the federal 
government.  
Another argument in favor of converse-1983 suits is their similarity to early 
American legal practices.20 From the Founding through much of the nineteenth 
century, a person aggrieved by the unconstitutional actions of a federal officer 
would sue the officer using a common law cause of action—whether for damages 
or relief through habeas corpus.21 These common law actions suggest that state 
law—and by extension, states themselves—were to play a significant role in 
checking constitutional overreaching by federal officers. This evidence, combined 
with Madison’s belief that the state and federal governments “will controul each 
other” suggests that converse-1983 laws are “a dramatic set of progressive actions 
that states may take in the service of federal constitutional rights.”22 
This Article disagrees. Although states have the constitutional power to enact 
converse-1983 laws, the federal government possesses a superior power through 
which it can limit or even abrogate these laws whenever it pleases. Because 
converse-1983 laws can therefore exist only at the pleasure of the federal 
government, it can hardly be said that these laws are a way for states to control the 
federal government. 
                                                                                                                 
Federal Agents: An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (2004) 
(arguing that “state governments may use the Constitution as more than a shield for 
themselves; they may use it to affirmatively shield the citizens from federal laws that trample 
. . . on individuals’ rights”); Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All 
Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2274 
(1999) (referring to Professor Amar’s converse-1983 work as a “very important scholarly 
contribution[] to our understanding of the law of federal jurisdiction”); John O. McGinnis & 
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal 
System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 110–11 (2004) (citing converse-1983 suits as a way in which 
“state governments can sometimes use their powers to block or mitigate federal violations of 
fundamental individual rights”); Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems 
Created by the National Convention Amendment Method and How To Fix Them, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 1509, 1576 (2010) (stating that it is “not clear that [arguments against converse-1983 
laws] would be persuasive”); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State 
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1458 (1999) (expressing 
support for the “thrust” of Professor Amar’s argument); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. 
Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the 
Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2246–49 (2003) (supporting the converse-1983 in 
part, but disagreeing with Professor Amar’s claim that states may control the scope of 
federal immunity); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally 
Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 125 n.244 (1997) (briefly noting the converse-1983 
action and expressing concern about its viability).  
 17. Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1504–06.  
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 282 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1506–09.  
 21. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804). 
 22. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 159.  
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My analysis of converse-1983 laws has two halves. In the first half, I consider 
the fate of a converse-1983 law under the current law of federal supremacy and 
offer four reasons why the converse-1983 action will not allow states to punish 
constitutional violations by federal officers. First, federal officers sued in a 
converse-1983 action would be entitled to a robust defense of immunity provided 
by the Supremacy Clause.23 This defense, which will immunize officers for all 
reasonable and nonmalicious violations, will take much of the bite out of a 
converse-1983 action. Second, converse-1983 suits will always be subject to the 
creation of, and preemption by, federal common law. Using its federal common 
law-making power, the Supreme Court has gutted state causes of action in this way 
before, and there is good reason to think it would do just that when presented with a 
converse-1983 action. Third, the success of a converse-1983 action could be 
affected by the Supreme Court’s current Bivens jurisprudence—a body of federal 
law allowing damages suits to be brought against federal officers.24 Although the 
exact effect of the Bivens doctrine is difficult to predict under the current cases, 
there can be little doubt that the Supreme Court’s authority over Bivens actions 
implicitly endows it with the authority to preempt converse-1983 actions. Fourth 
and finally, converse-1983 actions will be vulnerable to Congress’s authority to 
partially or fully preempt the causes of action. Congress’s authority to abrogate 
constitutional remedies is not absolute, but given the remedies currently available 
other than a converse-1983 action, Congress most surely enjoys the authority to 
nullify a converse-1983 action. In sum, this half of the Article shows that converse-
1983 actions present little hope to a state desiring to punish constitutional 
violations committed by federal officers. 
In the second half of my analysis, I turn back the clock and consider whether 
converse-1983 suits would have been any more helpful at the Founding. My 
conclusion is no different, however: at the Founding, the converse-1983 action 
would have been just as vulnerable to preemption (and thus useless in controlling 
the federal government) as it would be in modern times. In reaching this 
conclusion, I address three pieces of Founding-era evidence cited as support for 
converse-1983 laws. First, I consider the claim—allegedly evidenced in the 
Federalist Papers—that the Founders believed states to have a legal power to 
punish federal constitutional violations. This view is flawed, I explain. The 
Federalist Papers spoke of state power to check the federal government in 
political, not legal, terms. State governments were to secure the rights of citizens 
by “sound[ing] the alarm to the people,” not by enacting new laws.25  
Second, I consider the nineteenth-century practice of suing federal officers 
under the common law for their constitutional violations. Although these suits 
might seem to support states’ unilateral power to hold federal officers liable under 
state law, a close reading of the cases actually suggests otherwise. Though 
ostensibly “common law” actions, the law applied in these suits was a general 
common law of officer liability that was largely disconnected with state law. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 141 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
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Indeed, the federal courts appeared to enjoy near total control over this body of 
“common law.”  
Third, I finish this half of the Article by briefly addressing the alleged 
availability of state habeas actions against federal wardens in the early nineteenth 
century. These actions might be read to support a state power to maintain 
converse-1983 actions, but the evidence suggests otherwise. To the extent these 
habeas actions were even available, they were available only at the pleasure of the 
Congress. Thus, even if habeas petitions could be filed against federal officers, 
these petitions do not prove that states had the unilateral power to enact them, they 
simply prove that states had permission to enact them. 
Together, this Article’s two halves show that the converse-1983 action is a 
flawed vehicle for checking constitutional violations committed by federal officers. 
But why should anyone care? The fate of converse-1983 laws matters because the 
country and the academy are focused now more than ever on how states can rein in 
the federal government. States are experimenting in ways unheard of in modern 
times, including suing the federal government,26 instructing state officers not to 
enforce federal law,27 and even enacting laws that attempt to nullify federal 
regulations.28 At the same time, the academy has turned with renewed vigor to the 
federal-state relationship. Recent articles have explored state power to resist federal 
commandeering,29 state discretion in enforcing federal law,30 the role of state law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (constitutional challenge by over twenty states to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
598, 602–07 (E.D. Va. 2010) (constitutional challenge by Virginia against same legislation).  
 27. Most commonly, states have resisted the enforcement of federal immigration laws as 
well as antiterror laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act. For examples of such laws, see Ann 
Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1231, 1253–57 (2004); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not To Cooperate?: 
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382–84 
(2006) (assessing state or local “sanctuary laws” intended to preclude providing assistance to 
the federal government in the enforcement of federal immigration laws). 
 28. As of this writing, the National Conference of State Legislatures reports that at least 
forty states have enacted or are considering legislation aimed at overriding the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. See State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain 
Health Reforms, 2011, NCSL (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906. For a 
discussion of other state initiatives, see Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry of 
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1. A newly formed organization, the Tenth 
Amendment Center, maintains updated lists of state efforts to oppose or nullify federal law. 
See The 10th Amendment Nullification Movement, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., 
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement.  
 29. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 27, at 1232 (addressing state or local efforts to refuse 
assistance to the federal government in the “war on terrorism”); Pham, supra note 27, at 
1374, 1382–84 (assessing state or local “sanctuary laws” intended to preclude providing 
assistance to the federal government in the enforcement of federal immigration laws).  
 30. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: 
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 534 
(2011) (arguing “that state implementation of federal law plays many different roles, and that 
those differences should affect both how statutes are interpreted and how they are conceived 
from a federalism perspective”); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 
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in reforming federal agencies,31 and state political resistance to federal law.32 An 
assessment of converse-1983 laws thus sits at the confluence of popular and 
academic interest.  
This Article unfolds as follows: In Part I, I explain the conception of federalism 
in which converse-1983 laws would find traction, and then explain in detail that 
nature of the causes of action. Then, in Part II, I evaluate the fate of converse-1983 
laws according to current understanding of federal power. In Part III, I evaluate the 
Founding-era evidence supporting converse-1983 actions and then briefly 
conclude.  
I. PROFESSOR AMAR ON FEDERALISM AND CONVERSE-1983 
In this Part, I lay a foundation for the analysis in Parts II and III. I first explain 
Professor Amar’s understanding of American federalism and, in particular, his 
view on the states’ role in checking the federal government. Then, I explain in 
detail the content and operation of converse-1983 laws. Together, these two 
sections convey Amar’s view that converse-1983 laws are entirely ordinary causes 
of action that fit comfortably within the assumptions underlying our constitutional 
design.  
A. Federalism 
The supposed benefits of federalism have been well rehearsed in the courts and 
the academy. Robust local power is preferable, it is argued, because (1) states can 
more easily experiment in public administration, (2) states can compete with other 
states for citizens’ affections, (3) liberty is best protected by diffusing power, and 
(4) public involvement is higher at the local level. 33 
                                                                                                                 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011) (arguing that states can affect the force of federal law through 
their control over various channels of enforcement). 
 31. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2011) (considering the role of state law in recent Supreme Court decisions involving 
preemption); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” 
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009) (comparing state efforts to impact federal law at 
agency and congressional level).  
 32. See, e.g., JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM, HOW STATES PROTECT 
THEIR INTEREST IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 14 (2009) (focusing on how “state officials—
[including] governors, state legislators, heads of state agencies, and staff members working 
on their behalf—attempt to influence federal policymaking and when, how, and why they 
succeed”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (explaining that states can often frustrate federal regulatory efforts by 
formally expressing disapproval or implementing federal law in ways contrary to federal 
goals); Barak Y. Orbach, Kathleen S. Callahan & Lisa M. Lindemenn, Arming States’ 
Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1161, 1163 (2010) (explaining how lobbyists opposed to federal policy “harness states and 
localities in order to challenge federal policies”).  
 33. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991); FERC v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 742, 788–89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A 
DIALOGUE 75–106 (1995); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double 
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 136–39 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, “A 
1704 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1697 
 
Professor Amar is familiar with these models, but believes they are incomplete. 
The Founding generation expected the states to be more than simply an alternative 
to the federal government, he believes; it expected states to actually check the 
federal government’s operations. This check is suggested in Federalist 51, where 
James Madison assures those fearful of federal power that “[t]he different 
governments will controul each other.”34 States might “controul” the federal 
government in several ways. The most predictable is through political persuasion, a 
mechanism that Professor Amar acknowledges.35 But Amar believes that states also 
possess a legal power to control the federal government. 
Amar discerns this legal power from a symmetry he deems present in the 
constitutional design.36 If the federal and state governments are supposed to control 
each other, and if the federal government possesses the legal power to punish state 
constitutional violations, then states must possess that same power. This is the 
“beauty of constitutional federalism,” Amar explains.37 Where one government 
fails to keep up its end of the bargain, the other can—and likely will—step in to 
protect citizens’ rights. “[F]ederalism abhors a remedial vacuum,” according to 
Amar.38 When state power is so understood, the “Tenth Amendment appears as the 
symmetrical counterpart of the enforcement clauses of the Civil War 
Amendments.”39 That is, just as Congress derives its power to check the states from 
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 
the states derive their power to check the federal government from the Tenth 
Amendment.40 Each government has the legal—not just political—power to check 
the other. 
One towering case seems to stand in the way of Professor Amar’s views on 
federalism: McCulloch v. Maryland.41 In McCulloch, the Supreme Court held that 
the state of Maryland was constitutionally prohibited from imposing a tax on a 
federal bank—a bank Maryland believed was unconstitutional.42 McCulloch would 
thus seem to bar states from punishing the federal government for alleged 
constitutional violations. Yet Amar contends that McCulloch can be easily misread. 
                                                                                                                 
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 752, 774–79 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, 
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee 
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 
(1988); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–63 
(2004). 
 34. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 282 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 35. See Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1503–04.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1504.  
 38. Id. at 1505. 
 39. Id. at 1506. 
 40. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all law-making powers not specifically 
granted to the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
 41. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 42. Id. at 400. 
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The key to understanding the case for converse-1983 purposes, he explains, lies in 
“how the Supreme Court structured its analysis.”43 To wit:  
The first question, said the Court, was whether the bank was in fact 
constitutional. Only after assuring itself that the bank was indeed 
consistent with the federal Constitution—“necessary and proper”—did 
the Court address what it labelled as the second question in the case: 
whether the state of Maryland could nonetheless impose its tax. The 
structure of the Court’s analysis and several passages in the opinion 
plainly imply that if the bank had indeed been unconstitutional, perhaps 
state law could impose liability on the bank official, Mr. McCulloch. If 
anything, all this suggests that when federal officials are acting in 
violation of the federal Constitution, state law-created liability may 
well be appropriate at times.44  
Thus, for Professor Amar, our constitutional federalism only endows states with 
power to regulate the federal government’s unlawful activities. Where an action is 
lawful, states must stand down. Where an action is unlawful, however, states are 
free to punish the misbehavior. The federal government can hardly claim the 
protection of the Supremacy Clause when it is flouting the Constitution to begin 
with.  
In sum, for Professor Amar, the structure of our Constitution presupposes a state 
power to legally punish constitutional transgressions committed by federal officers. 
With this brief introduction, I turn now to the converse-1983 laws that Amar finds 
permissible under this structure.  
B. Converse-1983 
In many respects, converse-1983 laws are similar to the thousands of other laws 
enacted by states each year. They represent a government response to a perceived 
ill suffered by state citizens. In other respects, however, the laws’ application to 
federal officers makes them quite distinctive. Below, I explain Professor Amar’s 
description of the laws, including their necessity, creation, adjudication, remedies, 
and susceptibility to preemption.  
1. Necessity 
In considering the propriety of converse-1983 actions, it is first important to ask 
why they are even necessary. True, the federal government commits its share of 
constitutional violations, but the current law already provides victims with a means 
of redress. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,45 victims of constitutional 
violations can sue the offending federal officer for damages. In addition, if the 
constitutional violation would be actionable as a tort (e.g., an exercise of excessive 
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment will usually give rise to a claim of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 168. 
 44. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 45. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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common law battery), victims could make use of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA).46  
In Professor Amar’s view, these remedies are weak alternatives to the 
converse-1983 action. For one, “Bivens could in theory be overruled tomorrow.”47 
This was a reasonable possibility when Professor Amar wrote that in 1993 and it 
remains a possibility today.48 With Bivens gone or on life support, the only remedy 
available would be under the FTCA. Yet, according to Amar, the FTCA “may well 
not apply” because tort law is an imperfect replacement for constitutional 
interests.49 Some constitutional violations will amount to private law torts, but 
others will not.50 Thus, it is likely that the “various margins of the Fourth 
Amendment and other constitutional rights will be unenforced or underenforced.”51 
In Professor Amar’s view, therefore, converse-1983 actions are necessary to fill 
current or future remedial gaps.  
2. Creation and Adjudication 
If a state felt a converse-1983 action was appropriate, how could it create one? 
A state could promulgate a converse-1983 cause of action in one of two ways: 
through legislative enactment or judicial creation.52 The legislative route would 
perhaps be the most ordinary route, as legislatures routinely enact statutes that 
provide a cause of action to someone who has been harmed by a breach of some 
duty. Using Professor Amar’s formulation, the statute might look nearly identical to 
the current § 1983—something like this: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of the United States, subjects or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of this state or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.53  
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (permitting suit against the federal government where 
the harm suffered would be cognizable under the law of the state where the harm occurred).  
 47. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 172.  
 48. See James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in 
Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1387 (2010) (reviewing the Bivens doctrine 
and the Court’s hostility to it since the 1980s).  
 49. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 150, 175. 
 50. For example, a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim could often be recast as 
the tort of battery, but an equal protection violation will rarely have a tort analog. For a 
discussion of the overlap between tort and constitutional law, see John F. Preis, Alternative 
State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723 (2008). 
 51. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 173. 
 52. Professor Amar notes a third way: through amendment of the state constitution. See 
id. at 161. The distinction between statutory and constitutional creation is unimportant for 
the purposes of this Article. 
 53. Id. at 160 (emphasis in original).  
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If a state judiciary were so inclined, it too could create a converse-1983 action. 
State courts have long had the discretion to create or abolish causes of action. 
Sometimes the cause of action provides a standard of care as well as the right to 
sue, such as with the judicial creation of a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.54 Other times, however, the cause of action does not contain any 
standard of care but simply creates a “right to sue” to enforce a statute containing a 
standard of care. Courts essentially do this when they create negligence per se 
actions, which are tort actions that incorporate a statutory duty as the appropriate 
standard of care. Indeed, state negligence per se actions occasionally involve 
federal law,55 though no state appears to have attempted to impose liability against 
a federal officer. 
Though created by state institutions, converse-1983 suits would almost always 
be litigated in federal court. Some plaintiffs might choose to file in federal court as 
an original matter,56 but even cases begun in state court would almost certainly end 
up in federal court under the federal officer removal statute.57 Despite being 
litigated in federal court, federal judges would still be bound to apply the state 
cause of action—just as they are required in standard diversity cases. As Professor 
Amar explains, “Under the Rules of Decision Act and the Tenth Amendment, a 
state statutory cause of action (unless it somehow violates the federal Constitution 
or a constitutional federal statute) is a substantive law that federal courts must 
enforce.”58 
3. Damages and Immunity 
Being free to create a cause of action, a state would also be free to specify the 
appropriate damages for a constitutional violation. Thus, if it desired, a state could 
set a standard damages judgment for every violation—say $25,000. States could 
not, according to Professor Amar, “provide for liability far in excess of making a 
plaintiff whole, and far in excess of the quantum of damages for other state causes 
of action.”59 In that situation, the law would exceed the state role in preserving 
liberty and simply amount to a “punitive” measure.60  
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977) (creating the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress); Womack v. Eldridge., 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974) (same).  
 55. See Pauline E. Calande, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the 
Demise of the Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144 (1985) (identifying 
negligence per se actions using federal law).  
 56. Federal jurisdiction may be based on the diversity of the parties, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 (2006), or based on the presence of a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); 
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (holding that 
federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over state law causes of action that involve 
“substantial” federal questions).  
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2006). As a practical matter, federal officers sued in state court 
almost always remove the case to federal court.  
 58. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 166–67 (footnote omitted).  
 59. Id. at 168.  
 60. Id. 
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Closely related to the issue of damages is immunity. Professor Amar argues that 
states need not provide immunity to federal officers. This is significant because the 
current law of federal immunity bars recovery in a large number of civil rights 
actions.61 Amar acknowledges that the Court has “creat[ed] various zones of 
immunity for government officials” in civil rights cases but argues that the “Court 
has never said that the Constitution requires these zones of immunity. Nor, to my 
knowledge, has the Court ever applied these zones of immunity where a cause of 
action for unconstitutional federal conduct was created by state law, such as 
trespass law.”62 Thus, in Amar’s view, the scope of immunity in a converse-1983 
action, if any, would be within the control of the states.  
4. Interaction with Federal Law  
How would converse-1983 suits be impacted by federal law? Professor Amar 
does not consider how judicially created law—such as Bivens—would impact 
converse-1983 suits. But he apparently believes that federal courts would be 
obligated to give effect to the state actions regardless of judge-made law like 
Bivens.63  
The preemptive impact of a federal statute, however, is a different matter. 
According to Amar, Congress’s interest in “eliminating a patchwork of state law 
remedies so that a federal officer’s liability will not wildly fluctuate as he moves 
from state to state” justifies the creation of a federal cause of action against federal 
officers.64 If Congress creates such a cause of action, the converse-1983 action 
must yield. Yet Professor Amar holds that Congress cannot simply replace 
converse-1983 actions with some anemic federal version of a converse-1983 suit. 
That is, “if Congress seeks to oust [a converse-1983 law], Congress must itself 
provide a federal remedy at least as generous as the most generous state remedy 
Congress seeks to preempt.”65 If Congress had the “plenary power to nullify any 
state remedy it disliked,” Amar explains, the “careful constitutional balance of 
federalism [would be disturbed], and would ultimately imperil individual 
constitutional liberty by weakening an important check against federal abuse.”66  
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public 
Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 65–66, 79–80 (1999) 
(explaining that Bivens suits rarely result in an assessment of damages and that “[q]ualified 
immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar” to recovery). Even with the defense of 
immunity, however, there is evidence that Bivens actions will lead to a monetary settlement 
in a significant number of cases. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens 
Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 
813 (2010) (“Bivens cases are much more successful than has been assumed by the legal 
community, and . . . in some respects they are nearly as successful as other kinds of 
challenges to governmental misconduct.”).  
 62. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 174 (emphasis in original). 
 63. Id. at 166–67 (explaining that “federal courts must enforce” a converse-1983 law 
“unless it somehow violates the federal Constitution or a constitutional federal statute”).  
 64. Id. at 179. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1518.  
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In sum, Professor Amar views our Constitution as endowing states with the legal 
power to check federal constitutional transgressions. This power is important 
because existing remedies—whether under the Federal Tort Claims Act or 
Bivens—are tenuous and limited. States could improve upon such remedies by 
creating a cause of action that is not burdened by the ubiquitous defenses of 
immunity. Although Congress possesses the power to override converse-1983 laws, 
it cannot nullify them without providing an equally powerful replacement.  
If Professor Amar is correct on these points, converse-1983 laws would give 
states a powerful way to fight the federal government. The question is, however, is 
Professor Amar correct?  
II. THE VALUE OF THE CONVERSE-1983 ACTION TODAY 
In this Part, I argue that the converse-1983 action will be of little help to states 
currently wishing to rein in the federal government. The impotency of the cause of 
action derives not from its patent unconstitutionality, but from its vulnerability to 
nullification by the federal government. Converse-1983 laws are relatively useless 
if the federal government is free to ignore them at its pleasure. 
The current vulnerability of converse-1983 laws to federal supremacy is 
four-fold. First, federal officers sued in a converse-1983 action would have access 
to a powerful immunity defense arising from the Supremacy Clause; second, the 
federal courts could override converse-1983 laws through the creation of federal 
common law; third, converse-1983 suits would possibly (though not certainly) be 
preempted by the Supreme Court’s Bivens jurisprudence; and fourth, Congress 
could preempt such laws without providing a remedial replacement. 
A. Officer Immunity Under the Supremacy Clause  
One reason that converse-1983 actions can “make a big difference,” argues 
Professor Amar, is because they need not grant federal defendants the generous 
immunity defenses that are normally provided in Bivens actions.67 This claim, 
however, ignores “Supremacy Clause immunity,” an immunity defense that shields 
federal officers from liability under state law. As explained below, Supremacy 
Clause immunity insulates federal officers from liability under state law for actions 
taken within the general scope of their employment.  
The concept of federal immunity under the Supremacy Clause can be traced to 
McCulloch v. Maryland.68 McCulloch arose from Maryland’s attempt to tax the 
Bank of the United States, which established a branch in Baltimore.69 The case is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 174. Professor Vikram Amar 
makes this same point in a later article. Amar, supra note 16, at 1379 (“Moreover, and more 
important, a converse-1983 cause of action need not be saddled with the ‘qualified 
immunity’ doctrines that courts have read into § 1983 and the Bivens creation.”). 
 68. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 69. Id. at 400–01. 
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typically cited for the scope of Congress’ power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, but it also contains an important statement on the force of the Supremacy 
Clause. The Court held that Maryland’s tax was inapplicable to the Bank because a 
state has no power to interfere with “the legitimate operations of a supreme 
government.”70 Put differently, McCulloch holds that where the federal government 
is engaged in “legitimate operations,” it is immune from state interference.71  
Under McCulloch, for example, a state cannot require a federal mail carrier to 
obtain a state driver’s license72 because the delivery of the mail is undoubtedly a 
legitimate operation of the federal government.73 A federal mail carrier prosecuted 
for driving without a license could raise as a defense her lawful execution of a 
legitimate government operation. In contrast, if the carrier was charged with the 
same infraction while driving off-duty, no such defense would exist.  
Sometimes the line between legitimacy and illegitimacy is much harder to draw. 
What if a mail carrier, in the middle of her daily route, mistakenly perceives a 
threat from a dog and kills the dog with a Taser? Was this death caused during a 
legitimate government operation? On the one hand, the interference of dogs with 
the delivery of mail is so routine that efforts to address that interference would 
appear to be a legitimate governmental operation.74 On the other hand, it seems 
anomalous to conclude that the unjustified taking of an animal is a legitimate 
governmental operation. The line between a legitimate and illegitimate 
governmental activity is thus not an easy line to draw.  
Enter the Supreme Court in 1890, which drew this line in In re Neagle.75 Neagle 
is a dramatic case on its facts alone. While Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field 
was on a train riding circuit in 1889, a disgruntled litigant stormed the Justice’s 
dining car.76 A deputy marshal guarding Justice Field intercepted the intruder with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Id. at 427. 
 71. Chief Justice Marshall made this same point five years later in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 865–66 (1824), stating:  
An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, 
nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this order. His 
security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual thing for an act of 
Congress to imply, without expressing, this very exemption from State 
control . . . . The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the mint 
establishment, and all those institutions which are public in their nature, are 
examples in point. It has never been doubted, that all who are employed in 
them, are protected, while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not 
expressed in any act of Congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the 
several acts by which these institutions are created, and is secured to the 
individuals employed in them, by the judicial power alone . . . . 
 72. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).  
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress authority “[t]o establish Post Offices and 
post Roads”).  
 74. As it turns out, the problem is so ubiquitous that the United States Postal Service has 
even published a pamphlet instructing mail carriers on the proper ways to avoid dog bites. 
See UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, HOW TO AVOID DOG BITES: DOGS AND DOG REPELLANT 
(2000), http://uspspublications.lettercarriernetwork.info/pub174.pdf. 
 75. 135 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 76. Id. at 52–53. 
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a gunshot, taking his life.77 The marshal believed—mistakenly, it turned out—that 
the assailant was armed with a knife.78 The local district attorney charged the 
marshal with murder.79 The marshal’s vulnerability to the force of state law 
eventually came before the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held the 
marshal immune. In the Court’s view,  
[I]f the [marshal] is held in the state court to answer for an act which he 
was authorized to do by the law of the United States, which it was his 
duty to do as marshal of the United States, and if in doing that act he 
did no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do, he 
cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of the State of California.80  
Though the Court did not explain its conclusion in terms of Supremacy Clause 
immunity, it is clear that the concepts of supremacy and preemption undergird the 
Court’s reasoning. When pressed with the argument that preemption was inapt here 
because there was “no statute authorizing any such protection as that which 
Neagle” provided to Justice Field,81 the Court responded by clothing the marshal’s 
behavior with the mantle of federal “law”: 
 In the view we take of the Constitution of the United States, any 
obligation fairly and properly inferrible from that instrument, or any 
duty of the marshal to be derived from the general scope of his duties 
under the laws of the United States, is “a law.”82  
The upshot of Neagle is that a federal officer is immune from liability under 
state law if he is acting within the “general scope of his duties.” Because this rule 
of immunity has its roots in the Supremacy Clause, it is commonly referred to as 
“Supremacy Clause immunity.”83 
In the decades after Neagle, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle of 
Supremacy Clause immunity in several cases.84 Yet the key principle of the case—
that an officer is immune for actions taken within the “general scope of his 
duties”—remained hazy. About the only guidance one could draw from the cases 
was that the federal officer’s action must have been “necessary and proper” to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. Id. at 53. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 5–6. 
 80. Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).  
 81. Id. at 58 (“It is not supposed that any special act of the Congress exists which 
authorizes the marshals or deputy marshals of the United States in express terms to 
accompany the judges of the Supreme Court through their circuits, and act as a body-guard 
to them, to defend them against malicious assaults against their persons.”).  
 82. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 83. See, e.g., New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 84. See, e.g, Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1908); United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 
200 U.S. 1 (1906); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 
276 (1899). 
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fulfillment of his duties.85 As recent debates over the meaning of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause show,86 the meaning of these words are far from exact.  
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit articulated a more workable standard in Clifton v. 
Cox.87 The case involved movie-like drama: two federal agents used a helicopter to 
land in a suspect’s back yard. Just after exiting the helicopter, one agent heard what 
he believed to be a gunshot and, at that same moment, saw his partner fall to the 
ground. There had been no gunshot, however, and the agent’s partner had simply 
tripped. As the suspect retreated into his house and later into the nearby woods, the 
FBI agent gave chase, ordering him several times to stop. The suspect never 
stopped and the agent shot him, taking his life.88 The state prosecuted the agent for 
murder and the agent sought relief through a federal habeas corpus action. The 
Ninth Circuit was therefore called on to determine whether the agent could, under 
the facts alleged in the indictment, be guilty under state law. If the officer was 
immune, the habeas petition must be granted.  
The Ninth Circuit granted the agent’s petition, holding that the agent’s discharge 
of his federal duties immunized him from state liability. In doing so, the Court 
offered a more specific definition of Supremacy Clause immunity:  
The significant question of whether the conduct [of the agent] was 
necessary and proper under the circumstances must still be answered. 
Essential to this determination, assuming the truth of the state’s 
evidence, is whether the [agent] employs means which he cannot 
honestly consider reasonable in discharging his duties or otherwise acts 
out of malice or with some criminal intent.89  
Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s formulation, the relevant inquiry has two prongs: 
(1) whether the officer’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, and (2) 
whether the officer acted with malice. Where an officer’s action is either 
unreasonable or malicious, immunity is forfeited. In the years since Clifton, the 
Ninth Circuit’s formulation has become the standard for Supremacy Clause 
immunity.90  
The scope of Supremacy Clause immunity will undoubtedly bar the 
converse-1983 action—at least insofar as the action withholds immunity from the 
officer as Professor Amar advocates.91 Under Supremacy Clause immunity, a state 
may not impose liability on officers who acted reasonably and in good faith. This 
means, of course, that states can impose liability on an officer who acted 
unreasonably or in bad faith. This may appear attractive to a state, since federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 75. 
 86. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
 87. 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 88. Id. at 724. 
 89. Id. at 728. 
 90. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006); New York 
v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2004); Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727, 744 (6th Cir. 
1988); Maryland v. DeShields, 829 F.2d 1121, 1121 (4th Cir. 1987); Baucom v. Martin, 677 
F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 91. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.  
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officers often act unreasonably or in bad faith. In reality, however, a converse-1983 
suit saddled with Supremacy Clause immunity improves only slightly, if at all, on 
the options currently available to state citizens, namely, suits pursuant to Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents.92  
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a federal officer could be sued for 
damages caused by “his unconstitutional conduct.”93 Despite the existence of this 
cause of action, officers nonetheless possess the powerful defense of “qualified 
immunity.”94 Similar to Supremacy Clause immunity, this standard immunizes 
federal officers for any action that was reasonable under the circumstances.95 The 
only difference between Supremacy Clause immunity and qualified immunity is 
that the former withholds immunity where the officer acted in bad faith, where the 
latter has no concern with the officer’s bad faith.96  
This means that the only advantage of a converse-1983 action over a Bivens 
action would be that a converse-1983 defendant would forfeit her immunity when 
acting with malice. But this advantage is likely to be of miniscule value to the 
states. There can be no doubt that some officers in the federal government 
periodically act with malice, but when a constitutional violation results from such 
behavior, there is a very good chance that the behavior, viewed objectively, will fall 
outside the boundaries of reasonableness. If so, the behavior, viewed under the 
current qualified immunity doctrine, will give rise to liability regardless of any 
malice.97 Thus, it is only the set of cases that involve malice but fall within the 
realm of reasonableness that will be subject to liability under a converse-1983 
action. This set of cases is likely to be vanishingly small.98 
In sum, the doctrine of Supremacy Clause immunity takes much wind out of the 
sails of Professor Amar’s proposed converse-1983 action. The doctrine will not 
prevent states from imposing liability on federal officials, but it will prevent states 
from overcoming the immunity rules that so often stand in the way of recovery. In 
this sense, the converse-1983 action is most certainly not a significant opportunity 
for states to “make a big difference” in constitutional enforcement against federal 
officers.99  
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
 93. Id. at 389.  
 94. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 95. Id. at 818. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Moreover, malice is exceedingly difficult to prove. See id. at 816. At least one 
circuit court has considered dropping the malice prong to Supremacy Clause immunity, thus 
making the immunity identical to that of qualified immunity. See Wyoming v. Livingston, 
443 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 98. My argument here is only that the converse-1983’s value added over a Bivens action 
is slight. If Bivens were overruled, then the comparative value of converse-1983 actions 
would significantly increase. As explained in the remainder of Part II, however, there are 
numerous other impediments to a successful converse-1983 action.  
 99. See Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 174. 
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B. Abrogation by Federal Common Law 
Supremacy Clause immunity is only one barrier to the converse-1983 action. 
Another is the federal common law. Federal common law is “law” within the 
meaning of the Supremacy Clause and thus has the power to nullify any contrary 
state law.100 In this section, I explain that federal courts have the power to create 
federal common law with the specific goal of nullifying converse-1983 actions. As 
such, converse-1983 actions cannot be regarded as a useful tool for checking 
federal officers who commit constitutional violations. 
Federal courts create common law, both consciously and unconsciously, in a 
multitude of settings.101 In some instances, such as the field of Supremacy Clause 
immunity, the Court does not acknowledge that its decisions amount to common 
law, although if pressed the Court would likely explain them that way.102 In other 
instances, however, federal courts self-consciously engage in common-law making 
when necessary “to protect uniquely federal interests.”103  
For example, in cases involving obligations on commercial paper, the Court has 
created a multitude of laws to protect the federal government’s interest as a 
commercial entity. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States104 is a classic example. In 
that case, a Pennsylvania bank improperly cashed a check issued by the federal 
government. After federal monies were drawn to reimburse the bank, the federal 
government sued the bank for the wrongfully withdrawn funds. Under 
Pennsylvania commercial paper law, however, the federal government was out of 
luck. Yet the Supreme Court held that state law did not apply to the case.105 What 
applied instead was a new law—created by the Supreme Court in Clearfield Trust 
itself. Under this new “common law” rule, the federal government would prevail. 
Indeed, the Court designed the new common law rule with the specific intention 
that the federal government prevail. It would be anomalous, thought the Court, if 
the “rights and duties of the United States” in its issuance of millions of federal 
checks were “dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state.”106 
Under the authority of Clearfield Trust, state laws addressing commercial paper are 
subject to revision or outright abrogation by the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955) (“States 
can no more override such judicial rules [i.e., federal common law] . . . than they can 
override Acts of Congress.”).  
 101. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (stating that “federal common law” “refer[s] to any rule of 
federal law created by a court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by 
federal enactments—constitutional or congressional” (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted)).  
 102. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 538 (2007) (stating that “federal courts [in 
Bivens actions] must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a 
common-law tribunal”). 
 103. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
 104. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
 105. Id. at 366–67. 
 106. Id.  
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In addition to the field of commercial paper, the Supreme Court has displaced 
state law in favor of federal common law in other areas, such as contracts and 
property.107 Of particular relevance to the converse-1983 action, one area of 
“peculiarly federal concern, warranting the displacement of state law, is the civil 
liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty.”108 Thus, in 
Westfall v. Erwin, a suit involving the liability of a federal officer for negligent 
acts, the Court explained that “the scope of absolute official immunity afforded 
federal employees is a matter of federal law, ‘to be formulated by the courts in the 
absence of legislative action by Congress.’”109 Although the Court speaks of 
“immunity” in Westfall, it is clear that the law-making power of the federal courts 
extends far beyond the discrete issue of immunity. In fact, the federal courts have 
broad authority to override state law through all sorts of doctrinal creations.  
Boyle v. United Technologies is particularly illustrative of this point.110 In Boyle, 
a father claimed that United Technologies was responsible for his son’s death. The 
son was killed in an army helicopter manufactured by United Technologies, a 
helicopter that Boyle alleged was negligently designed under Virginia tort law. The 
Supreme Court, however, displaced Virginia tort law with a law of its own design. 
Now denominated the “government contractor defense,” the Supreme Court’s 
creation allowed the contractor to escape liability if it could show that (1) the 
government approved the helicopter’s specifications, (2) the helicopter in fact 
complied with those specifications, and (3) the manufacturer warned the 
government of any specifications that created a risk of injury.111 What is significant 
about Boyle is that the federal government was not even a party to the case; yet the 
Supreme Court held that the case nonetheless touched on an area of important 
federal concern—the costs that contractors must bear in supplying goods to the 
federal government. It makes no sense, maintained the Court, for the cost of our 
national security to be based in part on the whims of state tort law. 
Boyle impacts the viability of converse-1983 suits in two ways. First, the case 
makes clear that the liability of federal officers will undoubtedly be seen as an area 
subject to the creation of federal common law. If federal common law is justified in 
cases involving federal contractors, it is certainly justified in cases involving 
federal officers themselves. Second, the case shows that converse-1983 actions will 
be subject to revision by a Court that sees itself as having wide-ranging common 
law powers in the field of federal officer liability.  
On this second point, suppose that a state-created converse-1983 action did not 
run afoul of Supremacy Clause immunity. Even after overcoming this barrier, 
however, the cause of action would still be subject to revision by the Court in a 
number of ways. The Court could modify the statute of limitations, cap the 
available damages, create evidentiary presumptions, impose burdens of proof, or 
simply create a blanket defense where liability would not be in the federal 
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interest.112 Any of these are within the realm of federal common law-making and 
any of them, if designed in a particular way, could essentially gut the 
converse-1983 action. It is not beyond the power of the federal courts to abrogate a 
state cause of action in its creation of federal common law.113 
It is impossible to know at this point whether the Court would use federal 
common law in this way. And I do not mean to suggest that the Court should use its 
common law powers to revise a converse-1983 action if one ever came before the 
Court. I mean only to note that the Court possesses—and has exercised—
significant authority to craft law in the field of federal officer liability. This stands 
in stark contrast to Professor Amar’s optimism for converse-1983 actions. He 
describes the laws as “a dramatic set of progressive actions that the states may take 
in the service of federal constitutional rights.”114 Yet if these actions are subject to 
veto by a Supreme Court that is willing to insulate even government contractors 
from liability, it can hardly be said that the states have any meaningful options. In 
short, if the federal government is determined to violate constitutional rights, 
converse-1983 actions will not stand in the way.  
C. The Force of Bivens 
In the previous section, I explained that the federal courts, by virtue of their 
power to create federal common law, possess the power to strip the converse-1983 
action of all or some of its force. In this section, I address a field of federal 
common law currently in existence that may defeat converse-1983 laws. The 
Bivens action is a species of federal common law and is essentially the federal 
counterpart to the proposed converse-1983 action. Both causes of action offer the 
successful plaintiff damages, and both rely on the Constitution for the standard of 
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care. The key difference115 is that the converse-1983 cause of action is created by 
state law, whereas Bivens is created by federal law. Given these similarities, it is 
appropriate to consider whether a converse-1983 action would be preempted by the 
Bivens doctrine as it currently stands. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed this precise question, but guidance can 
be gleaned from the cases. Unfortunately, the guidance points in different 
directions. As explained below, some Bivens opinions suggest that Congress alone 
possesses the authority over federal officer suits, while others suggest that states 
can in fact participate in enforcement efforts.  
1. Bivens as Barring the Converse-1983 Action 
One of the most persistent themes in Bivens jurisprudence over the past thirty 
years is that creating a cause of action is a legislative task, not a judicial one.116 
Take, for example, the Court’s reasoning in Bush v. Lucas.117 In Bush, a federal 
employee alleged that he was demoted for criticizing the federal government. He 
thus brought a Bivens action claiming a First Amendment violation. The Supreme 
Court rejected the suit because Congress had created a remedial scheme—
adjudication under the Civil Service Reform Act—specially designed to deal with 
federal employment disputes. As the Court explained, “it would be inappropriate 
for us to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy.”118 
Although Congress’s remedial scheme might not afford the plaintiff complete 
relief, and a Bivens action presumably would, the Court believed that “Congress 
[was] in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be 
served by creating [a Bivens-like action].”119  
Schweiker v. Chilicky120 tells a similar story. In Chilicky, the Supreme Court 
held that a Bivens action was unavailable to social security claimants denied their 
disability payments in violation of due process. Like Bush, the Court’s decision 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Another difference, though minor, is the immunity that would apply to these suits. 
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 117. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
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 120. 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). 
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rested entirely on a remedial scheme that Congress created to deal with wrongfully 
withheld payments. “When the design of a Government program,” Justice 
O’Connor explained, “suggests that Congress has provided what it considers 
adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the 
course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”121 In 
other words, Congress was entitled to “appropriate judicial deference.”122 
As Bush and Chilicky make clear, when the Court declines to create a Bivens 
action, it often does so out of respect for congressional prerogatives. It is the place 
of Congress, not the Court, to choose how federal law shall be enforced, the Court 
seems to be saying. What does this portend for the converse-1983 action? At first 
blush, one might find the separation of powers rationale underlying Bivens to be 
supportive of converse-1983 actions. That is, if the Court believes that it should not 
“assume[] common-law powers to create causes of action,”123 one might naturally 
conclude that an institution that does wield common law powers—like state 
courts—could create a constitutional cause of action. And just as legislatures have 
always been understood to possess the “powers to create causes of action,” a state 
legislature could enact a converse-1983 law without overreaching its authority.  
Though creative, this argument misses the point of much—but as explained in 
the following section, not all—of the Bivens case law. True, the Court often 
assumes a diminutive stance when declining to recognize a Bivens action, but this 
diminutive stance is simply another way of pointing out the superior position of 
Congress when it comes to regulating the liability of federal officials. It could 
hardly be the case that Congress is entitled to special deference from the Court in 
crafting damages actions, but that no constitutional principle entitles Congress to 
deference from a state.  
Consider an example based on Chappell v. Wallace.124 In Chappell, several 
navy seamen brought a Bivens action alleging unconstitutional racial 
discrimination. The men had no remedy against the government itself,125 so their 
only hope of obtaining relief was through a Bivens action against the responsible 
officers. The Court rejected the suit, explaining:  
Congress, the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the 
military system of justice, has not provided a damages remedy for 
claims by military personnel that constitutional rights have been 
violated by superior officers. Any action to provide a judicial response 
by way of such a remedy would be plainly inconsistent with Congress’ 
authority in this field.126 
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Suppose that the day after the Court issued its opinion in Chappell, the state of 
Texas created a converse-1983 action to deal with the mistreatment of army 
reservists in Texas. If a case was filed under this statute, it would almost certainly 
be removed to federal court. The federal court would thus be presented with the 
viability of a converse-1983 suit in light of the Supreme Court’s rejection of a 
Bivens action in the exact same context.  
Given the reasoning in Chappell, it is clear that Texas’s converse-1983 suit 
would fail. The court would not find the law legitimate simply because it was 
created by a government body with common law or legislative powers. The law 
would be null and void because it would interfere with Congress’s “constitutionally 
authorized . . . authority over the military system of justice.”127 Put differently, 
when the Court denied a Bivens action in Chappell, it did not simply decline to act 
as a common law or legislative body. It held that Congress, having superior 
authority on a matter of significant federal interest, was the institution that should 
decide whether to create a cause of action or not.  
It is important to acknowledge that context undoubtedly matters in these cases. 
It is not at all surprising that the Court would hold that Congress possesses 
exclusive power over the military and that common law causes of action (whether 
according to Bivens or under state law) should not be permitted. In a different 
context, however, it might be arguable that Congress and the states possess a 
legitimate regulatory interest in the activity involved. If the alleged constitutional 
violation related to food safety, for example, the Court might be less willing to 
proclaim Congress the sole enforcer of constitutional rights. In the end, however, 
the precise scope of Congress’s exclusive power in any particular case is 
unimportant. The point here is simply that one theme underlying the Court’s Bivens 
jurisprudence is that it is Congress’s place to choose the methods of constitutional 
enforcement against federal officers. In many instances, this will necessarily 
foreclose the states from creating converse-1983 actions.  
2. Bivens as Permitting the Converse-1983 Action 
In 2001, the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence took a subtle turn that might 
nonetheless be quite consequential to the viability of converse-1983 actions. In that 
year, the Court decided Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, a case 
involving a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims of insufficient medical 
care.128 Like many previous Bivens cases, this one also hinged on the existence of 
alternative remedies. Thus, in rejecting a Bivens action, the opinion notes that the 
prisoner had “full access to remedial mechanisms established by the . . . [federal 
Bureau of Prisons’] Administrative Remedy Program.”129 Interestingly, however, 
the Court also cited a new type of alternative remedy—a state remedy. The prisoner 
in this case did not need a Bivens remedy, the Court explained, because he had 
access to a tort remedy under state law.130 That is, the prisoner could sue the 
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misbehaving officers for negligence in failing to provide him the proper care. 
Indeed, it is far easier to prevail in a negligence action than in an Eighth 
Amendment Bivens action, the Court noted.131 
Malesko was the first time the Court cited a state remedy as an alternative, but it 
was not the last. In the 2007 case of Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court also “assess[ed] 
the significance of any alternative remedies” available to a Bivens plaintiff.132 
Citing Malesko for the proposition that the “availability of state tort remedies” is 
sufficient to preclude a Bivens action, the Court pointed to trespass and malicious 
prosecution claims available to the plaintiff in that case.133 Most recently, the 
Court, in Minneci v. Pollard, refused a Bivens action to an inmate in a privately run 
prison because the misconduct alleged by the prisoner “typically falls within the 
scope of traditional state tort law.”134  
The ascendancy of state remedies in the Court’s recent Bivens jurisprudence 
suggests a type of judicial humility not found in the cases discussed in the previous 
section. In those earlier cases, the Court assumed a deferential position vis-à-vis 
Congress. In these newer cases, however, the Court seems to believe that state 
remedies can sometimes stand in the shoes of Bivens remedies. Seen in this way, 
Malesko, Wilkie, and Minneci appear to open the door to the converse-1983 
action—at least as far as Bivens is concerned.  
To understand this further, consider the following hypothetical. Recall that in 
Malesko, the Court held that a federal prisoner in a privately run facility could not 
bring a Bivens action, in part because of the existence of state remedies. Suppose 
that a state created a converse-1983 action that applied only to federal prisoners 
incarcerated in the state. Using this cause of action, the prisoner sued the 
misbehaving prison guards. If the case arrived at the Supreme Court, the Court 
would appear to be duty-bound to approve the cause of action. How could a state 
law tort action take the place of Bivens (as approved in Malesko and Wilkie) but a 
converse-1983 action offend Bivens? 
One has to be careful not to overread these cases. Just as in the previous section, 
context undoubtedly affects the Court’s views on these issues. Moreover, even 
though the Court has allowed state remedies to replace Bivens in some instances, it 
has signaled that state remedies may not always be sufficient to replace Bivens.135 
But given that Malesko, Wilkie, and Minneci are the Court’s most recent 
pronouncements on the state remedy issue, it appears more likely than not that 
Bivens would not stand in the way of a converse-1983 action. 
 
* * * 
 
The above analysis of Bivens cases does not yield a simple answer to the fate of 
converse-1983 laws. It suggests that, in some cases, converse-1983 laws would be 
impermissible, while in others, the laws would be a welcome addition to the 
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constitutional enforcement mechanisms already in use. At the very least, however, 
it is clear that the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence will play a role in the viability of 
converse-1983 laws, and that at least in some cases, the Bivens doctrine could—
either today or in the future—impose obstacles that effectively bar the state cause 
of action.  
D. Abrogation by Congress 
Even if converse-1983 laws could survive the effect of Supremacy Clause 
immunity, federal common law, and Bivens, they might still falter when subjected 
to the preemptive power of federal legislation. When it comes to congressional 
power, Professor Amar and I agree that Congress has the power to enact federal 
causes of action that explicitly or impliedly preempt converse-1983 laws.136 Where 
we disagree, however, is on the extent of federal power. Professor Amar believes 
that “if Congress seeks to oust [a converse-1983 action], Congress must itself 
provide a federal remedy at least as generous as the most generous state remedy 
Congress seeks to preempt.”137 As explained below, this is incorrect.  
Professor Amar’s view of Congress’s obligations stems from his belief in the 
“remedial imperative.”138 If “the Constitution draws its life from postulates that 
limit and control lawless governments,” he contends, then the Constitution 
necessarily contemplates “full redress whenever [constitutional] rights are 
violated.”139 As noted by Professor Amar, remedies must be more than generally 
available; a remedy must exist for every constitutional violation. As he puts it, 
“[f]ew propositions of law are as basic today—and were as basic and universally 
embraced two hundred years ago—as the ancient legal maxim, ubi jus, ibi 
remedium: Where there is a right, there should be a remedy.”140 If the Constitution 
requires every right to have a remedy, then Congress most certainly does not have 
the power to bar converse-1983 suits without supplying a replacement.141 Or so the 
argument goes.  
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Few can quibble with Amar’s remedial imperative as an aspirational matter. Its 
foundation in law is a different issue, however. Remedies in constitutional tort 
actions are routinely—if not typically—barred by immunity laws. A judge who 
orders a young woman sterilized without her knowledge is immune from suit, 
notwithstanding the fact that the order was patently unconstitutional.142 A 
prosecutor who fails to disclose exculpatory evidence is immune from suit, even 
though an innocent man might go to jail.143 A warden who orders routine strip 
searches of low-level prisoners need not pay a dime in damages, even though the 
searches were all unconstitutional.144 These examples are not aberrations in the 
field of constitutional torts; they are routine. Because of the law of official 
immunity, enormous numbers of constitutional violations go without remedies.145 
This is not to say that the current levels of immunity are properly calibrated as a 
normative matter.146 It is simply to say that the immunization of officers from 
liability does not offend the Constitution. It follows therefore that Congress can bar 
converse-1983 suits without offending the Constitution. 
Professor Amar is aware of these immunity doctrines but counters that the 
“Court has never said that the Constitution requires these zones of immunity.”147 
That is true enough, but it misses the relevant point. The key issue here is not 
whether the Constitution requires immunity, but simply whether it permits the 
federal government (via statute or precedent) to create zones of immunity for 
federal officers. On this point, there can be little dispute. The federal government 
quite clearly has such authority.148 As Richard Fallon and Daniel J. Meltzer have 
observed, “the structure of substantive, jurisdictional, and remedial doctrines that 
existed at the time of the Constitution’s framing and that evolved through the 
nineteenth century by no means guaranteed effective redress for all invasions of 
legally protected rights and interests.”149 To suggest otherwise would contradict not 
only the enormous weight of current practices, but also a body of historical 
practices reaching back to the Founding.  
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There is, however, an important caveat to this conclusion. To say that Congress 
can bar remedies is not to say that Congress could bar all remedies all of the time. 
It is well accepted that “the Founders . . . positioned the judiciary to keep the 
political branches within the bounds of their lawful authority.”150 It is similarly 
clear that the central way through which the judiciary discharges this role is 
through issuing remedies. Thus, lest the federal judiciary be shorn of its 
constitutional role, Congress may not bar every remedy.151  
If Congress can bar some remedies (e.g., the converse-1983 suit) but cannot bar 
every remedy, which, or how many, remedies may it bar? There is no universally 
accepted answer to this question, but there is significant agreement that “Congress 
necessarily has a wide choice in the selection of remedies”152 subject to the 
requirement that the chosen remedies be sufficient to “keep government, overall 
and on average, tolerably within the bounds of law.”153  
This means that Congress could bar the converse-1983 suit as long as there 
existed some other remedy or remedies that would keep federal officers more or 
less within the bounds of law. One remedy that currently serves this goal is the 
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1724 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1697 
 
Bivens action. The Bivens action has its limitations,154 of course, but there is 
evidence that it serves its purpose sufficiently well.155 Even if Bivens were deemed 
insufficient (or overruled), however, there would still exist other remedies.  
Take, for example, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Under the FTCA, an 
individual harmed by a federal employee’s tortious behavior can sue the federal 
government for relief.156 Thus, if a federal prison guard beats an inmate without 
cause, the inmate will be able to bring a battery claim against the federal 
government to obtain compensation. A battery claim is not, in name at least, the 
same as a Fourth or Eighth Amendment claim. But it will provide the plaintiff with 
compensation157 and, in that sense, mimic Bivens and converse-1983 actions in 
“keep[ing] government, overall and on average, tolerably within the bounds of 
law.”158 
The FTCA action is not a perfect substitute for the Bivens or converse-1983 
action. In some ways, it will be superior159 and in other ways it will be inferior.160 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. The cause of action is unavailable where “alternative remedies” or “special factors” 
are present. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). For a summary of the 
doctrine, see Pfander, supra note 48.  
 155. Reinert, supra note 61, at 813 (arguing that “Bivens cases are much more successful 
than has been assumed by the legal community, and that in some respects they are nearly as 
successful as other kinds of challenges to governmental misconduct”).  
 156. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Whether an officer’s behavior qualifies as tortious is 
determined according to the “law of the place” where the allegedly wrongful behavior 
occurred. Id.  
 157. For a defense of the role of subconstitutional law in enforcing constitutional norms, 
see John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2009). 
 158. Fallon, supra note 149, at 311. It should go without saying that this is an empirical 
question. If, for example, private contractors were routinely committing constitutional 
violations, and state law had immunized the contractors from liability, one could quite easily 
conclude that the remedial apparatus necessary to keep government within bounds was 
constitutionally deficient.  
 159. Unlike constitutional tort actions, FTCA actions are not saddled with the defense of 
qualified immunity. If a federal officer violates state tort law, compensation may issue, 
regardless of whether the tort law was “clearly established.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) 
(2006) (imposing liability on the United States “under circumstances where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the 
place where the [negligent or wrongful] act or omission occurred”); United States v. Olson, 
546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (stating that, because “the United States waives sovereign immunity 
‘under circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort,” any 
official or municipal immunity created by state law is not applicable in FTCA suits against 
the federal government (emphasis in original)). 
 160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006) (barring claims of “assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights” committed by non-law 
enforcement officers). One common bar to recovery under the FTCA—the “discretionary 
function exception”—is of questionable application in the constitutional enforcement setting. 
Under that exception, relief is unavailable where the harm alleged occurred during the 
officer’s discharge of a discretionary function. Plaintiffs often argue that behavior in 
violation of the Constitution cannot be regarded as “discretionary” within the meaning of the 
FTCA. Four circuits have agreed with this view, see Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945 (8th 
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The FTCA is not the only possible substitute, however. Other federal statutes often 
protect citizens from behavior that would be unlawful if measured against the 
Constitution. For example, federal officers are statutorily barred from 
discriminating against federal employees and are liable for damages if they do 
so.161 Indeed, this cause of action effectively replaced a Bivens action in the federal 
employment context.162 This phenomenon can be seen in other cases as well.163 
This is not to say that the current framework of remedies is superior to remedies 
that might be provided by a converse-1983 law. But that issue is of no 
constitutional relevance. The constitutional enforcement question presented here is 
not whether the converse-1983 action is better or worse than various alternatives; it 
is simply whether the remedies available in a world without converse-1983 are 
sufficient in and of themselves to uphold the rule of law. If they are, then Congress 
is free to prefer that the Constitution be enforced through those mechanisms rather 
than the converse-1983 mechanism.  
It is perhaps impossible in the space of this Article to conclusively show that the 
currently available remedies are sufficient to “keep [the federal] government, 
overall and on average, tolerably within the bounds of law.” Although there might 
be general agreement that the current availability of remedies is sufficient to this 
task, there will undoubtedly be areas where constitutionally intolerable remedial 
gaps can be found. It is unnecessary to canvass the entire spectrum of remedies, 
however, to argue that the susceptibility of converse-1983 laws to congressional 
preemption is significant in light of the remedies currently available through 
Bivens, the FTCA, and other federal statutes. There may exist one or another 
situation in which no alternative to converse-1983 can be found, but that hardly 
supports Professor Amar’s blanket claim that “if Congress seeks to oust [a 
converse-1983 action], Congress must itself provide a federal remedy at least as 
generous as the most generous state remedy Congress seeks to preempt.”164 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, Part II demonstrates that converse-1983 laws are not a reliable way for 
states to rein in federal officers who violate the Constitution. Such laws would be 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 2003); Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2001); Nurse v. United States, 
226 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2000); Prisco v. Talty, 993 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1993), while two have 
disagreed, see Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
902 (2011); Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 161. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination “based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” by the federal government).  
 162. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (holding that federal employee 
dismissed from job because she was a woman could bring a Bivens action to assert her equal 
protection rights). 
 163. See Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (suggesting that 
the “remedial mechanisms established by the . . . [Federal Bureau of Prisons’] 
Administrative Remedy Program” would provide federal prisoners with opportunities to 
vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) 
(holding that the procedural due process violation alleged in Bivens action could be 
adequately addressed through administrative procedures supplied by the Social Security 
Act). 
 164. Amar, Questions and Answers, supra note 15, at 179.  
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saddled with generous immunity defenses, subject to override by federal common 
law or Bivens actions, and vulnerable to abrogation by congressional statute. 
Although this is an accurate statement of the current law, it does not address 
Founding-era conceptions of state power relied upon by Professor Amar. It is to 
that topic that I now turn.  
III. THE VALUE OF THE CONVERSE-1983 ACTION AT THE FOUNDING 
Under current doctrine, converse-1983 laws are a nonstarter. But perhaps our 
modern conception of federal supremacy has broken free of its original moorings. 
Perhaps, at the time of the Founding, it was understood that states would have the 
power to impose liability on a federal officer for disobeying the federal 
Constitution. In defending converse-1983 laws, Professor Amar draws on a 
conception of state power articulated by James Madison in Federalist 51. In that 
paper, Madison argued that states would play a vital role in checking federal 
misbehavior:  
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people, is first divided between two distinct governments [the federal 
and the state], and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among 
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the 
rights of the people. The different governments will controul each 
other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.165 
Madison’s view of state power would seem to embrace converse-1983 laws. Such 
laws quite plainly seek to protect the “rights of the people” by “controul[ing]” the 
federal government.  
In addition to the theory of state power, however, Professor Amar also invokes 
the apparent practice of state power at the Founding. His first example of this 
practice is the nineteenth-century tort action brought against federal officers for 
unconstitutional acts. If a federal officer searched your home without a warrant, for 
example, the officer was not sued in a Bivens-style action at the Founding; instead, 
the officer was simply sued for trespass under the common law—a suit that 
suggests that states did have the unilateral power to render federal officers liable for 
damages. Professor Amar’s second example of this practice is state habeas 
proceedings against federal officers. According to Amar, “[s]tate habeas [during the 
first half of the nineteenth century] offered a way for those imprisoned by federal 
officers in violation of their federal constitutional rights to win their freedom.”166 
Although providing injunctive relief rather than damages, these suits too would 
seem to lend support to a Founding-era converse-1983 action.  
In this Part, I argue that Professor Amar is incorrect about the theory and 
practice of state power at the Founding. I first explain that the theory of state power 
expressed in the Federalist Papers does not support a power to impose liability on 
the federal government, even for the federal government’s unlawful behavior. The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 282 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (emphasis 
added). 
 166. Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1509.  
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state role in checking the federal government expressed there was political, not 
legal. Second, I explain that the state practices that Amar cites are not in fact 
evidence of a power to enact converse-1983 laws. The officer actions to which 
Amar refers were controlled by a common law theory of officer liability that was at 
best loosely connected with state law. Nor do the state habeas laws cited by Amar 
prove the existence of any autonomous state legal power. These laws existed only 
at the pleasure of Congress and thus could not have been a way for states to protect 
their citizens from constitutional violations by federal officers.  
To be sure, my arguments in this section are aimed only at disproving Professor 
Amar’s claims. Disproving his claims does not conclusively prove what the 
Founders did think about state power, or what power states did have. There thus 
exists the possibility that, as a theoretical or practical matter, state legal power 
could be located at the Founding. This Part suggests, however, that that possibility 
is unlikely and that Professor Amar has failed to adduce sufficient evidence 
proving otherwise.  
A. State Power in Theory 
To understand the idea of state power contemplated by the Founding generation, 
one must first understand the circumstances that produced the Constitution itself. 
Though generalizations are always dangerous, historians tend to agree that the 
robust and irresponsible use of power by the states was the chief impetus for the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787.167 During the 1780s, “[t]he states had become 
increasingly jealous of their power and in fact through their handling of public 
lands and public debts were fast moving to absorb the major political and economic 
groups, creating a vested interest in state sovereignty.”168 This jealousy 
impoverished national power and “left the United States at the mercy of other 
nations,” particularly in matters of international trade.169  
A robust state power could perhaps be defended if states were models of local 
government. They were anything but, however. Having freed themselves of British 
oversight after the Revolution, states quickly descended into an era of legis-mania. 
The solution to every problem, real or imagined, was legislation. “[I]ncompetent 
legislators were passing too many laws, and these poorly drawn acts were being 
repealed or revised before anyone could discover how well they were actually 
working. Such proceedings brought the very concept of law into contempt.”170 The 
multiplicity of laws was not the only problem, however; another problem was that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 
467 (1998).  
 168. Id. at 361.  
 169. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at 12 (2010) (“One incident after another demonstrated that Congress’s sorry financial 
state left the United States at the mercy of other nations.”). 
 170. JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
47 (1990).  
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the laws themselves were often fundamentally unjust.171 “By the 1780s, it seemed 
as if the majorities of the popular legislatures had become just as dangerous to 
individual liberties as the detested royal governors had been.”172 
Members of the Constitutional Convention were thus determined to rein in the 
state governments. One idea for accomplishing this goal was put forward by James 
Madison. He proposed that Congress be given the power to veto “all [state] laws 
which . . . shall appear improper,” regardless of whether the law was fundamentally 
just or not.173 The “corner stone of an efficient national Govt,” required federal 
power to nullify state laws that “destroy[ed] the order & harmony of the political 
system.”174 But alas, the national veto proved too much for the Convention to 
swallow.175 It was not the idea of federal supremacy, however, that was scrapped, 
only the mechanism. In its place, the Convention adopted what we know today as 
the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause retained the absolute supremacy of 
federal law, but referred the task of superintending state law to the courts rather 
than Congress.176 
In considering state power in our federalist system, therefore, one must keep 
first and foremost in mind two fundamental truths. First, the Constitutional 
Convention was called in 1787 chiefly to rein in the “evils operating in the 
states.”177 Second, the Convention reined in the states in large part through the 
Supremacy Clause, a provision that subordinated the states’ legal—but not 
political—power to that of the national government. With these two truths in mind, 
the stage is set for a consideration of Founding-era thoughts on the scope of state 
power. As explained below, these writings suggest—not surprisingly—that states 
were understood to possess political, not legal, power to check the federal 
government.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 334 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) 
(blaming the “embarrassments of America” on the state governments who were continually 
“repealing, explaining and amending laws”).  
 172. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 19 (2009); see also WOOD, supra note 167, at 467 (“It was ‘the vile State 
governments,’ rather than simply the feebleness of the Confederation, that were the real 
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mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States,’ the ‘evils operating in the States,’ that 
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 173. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 719 
(1998) (quoting statements of Convention participants).  
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 730 (“Madison’s arguments notwithstanding, the negative fell, seven states 
to three.”)  
 176. Id. at 730 (explaining that the Supremacy Clause “delegate[d] to judges (state and 
federal) what previously had been the [national] veto’s function of voiding state law contrary 
to federal law”); see also Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial 
Independence, 95 GEO L.J. 1061, 1068–69 (2007) (“The significance of the Supremacy 
Clause cannot be overstated. It not only confirmed the status of the Constitution as 
fundamental law, but it also made the enforcement of its essential division of power between 
the Union and the States an inherently judicial function.”).  
 177. WOOD, supra note 167, at 467 (quotation marks omitted). 
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Madison’s assertion that state governments “will controul” the federal 
government appeared in the Federalist Papers, so it is sensible to explore those 
writings further to better understand the assertion. One must be cautious in relying 
on the Federalist Papers, of course, for they were explicitly partisan. Yet on the 
issue of using state power to check the federal government, their views are quite 
representative of the thinking at the time.178 With that in mind, the first Paper to 
consider is Federalist 46. There, James Madison rendered the idea of state power 
more concrete by articulating the states’ “means of defeating [federal] 
encroachments.”179  
[S]hould an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be 
unpopular in particular states, which would seldom fail to be the case, 
or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the 
case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The 
disquietude of the people, their repugnance and perhaps refusal to 
co-operate with the officers of the union, the frowns of the executive 
magistracy of the state, the embarrassments created by legislative 
devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose 
in any state, difficulties not to be despised; would form in a large state 
very serious impediments, and where the sentiments of several 
adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions 
which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.180 
To Madison, therefore, it was the spirit of the polity that would turn federal 
encroachments away, not the force of state law. The “disquietude of the people,” 
the “frowns of the executive magistracy,” and embarrassing “legislative devices” 
(which were almost certainly nonbinding resolutions181) would all “present 
obstructions” to an overbearing federal government. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. As Larry Kramer has put it,  
Using The Federalist to gauge the perceptions of other participants in the 
Founding can be problematic, and it is sometimes misleading to rely too 
heavily on this one source. . . . But not on the question of federalism. On this 
issue, what Publius had to say was no different from what everyone else was 
saying, just more clearly and fully articulated.  
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 257 (2000).  
 179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 257–58 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 180. Id. 
 181. There are two reasons this is so. First, Madison makes clear that these legislative 
devices would be used to oppose both unconstitutional (“unwarranted”) and constitutional 
(“warranted”) federal laws. Even if one accepts that states might regulate unconstitutional 
federal behavior, it is virtually unthinkable that Madison (who himself proposed the national 
veto) was suggesting that states could oppose lawful federal action through the enactment of 
binding state law. Instead, he was almost certainly referring to nonbinding resolutions. 
Second, there is prominent evidence that states engaged in this exact form of shaming in 
response to federal constitutional transgressions. For instance, in response to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts enacted in 1798, the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky both passed 
resolutions denouncing the Acts as unconstitutional. See KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS (Nov. 10, 
1798, Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131–35 (Philip B. 
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Alexander Hamilton strikes the same chord in Federalist 28. He begins first 
with a description of local resistance to state authority—which he deems rather 
spare. “In a single state,” he explains, “if the persons entrusted with supreme power 
become usurpers, [the citizens] can take no regular measures for defence. [They] 
must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; 
except in their courage and despair.”182 But if the “usurper” is the federal 
government, citizens have significantly more power because they can rely on the 
local “organs of civil power,” that is, the state governments. State governments are 
centralized and organized; they possess “all the resources of the community.” They 
thus “can readily communicate with each other in the different states . . . and [can] 
unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.”183  
In Hamilton’s view, therefore, states are not legal bullies; instead, they are 
public relations agents. State governments aggregate popular opinion and then join 
“forces” with like-minded states in an effort to protect the “common liberty.” This 
is not a picture of legal regulation; it is a picture of grassroots political activism.  
Further evidence that states were to check the federal government through 
political—as opposed to legal—means can be found in Hamilton’s classic 
explanation of competition between the state and federal governments: 
Power being almost always the rival of power; the general government 
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
governments; and these will have the same disposition towards the 
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either 
scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by 
either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress.184 
Hamilton thus sees protection for the people in the “prepondera[nce]” of popular 
will, not in a legal mechanism enacted by a state legislature. Further evidence of 
this perspective abounds in the Federalist Papers. Both Federalist 26 and 46 
explain that federal encroachments need not be feared because state legislatures 
will undoubtedly “sound the alarm” to warn the citizens.185 Federal encroachments, 
                                                                                                                 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (Dec. 21, 
1798), reprinted in id. at 135–36. These resolutions were self-consciously nonbinding, 
amounting merely to “expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect than 
what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection.” JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE 
RESOLUTIONS (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 402 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1906). Neither state attempted to legally bind the federal government to obey the 
First Amendment. Nor did any victim of prosecution under the Acts apparently sue federal 
officers in a common law action.  
 182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 150 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 183. Id. at 150–51.  
 184. Id. at 150. 
 185. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 26, at 141, 46 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) 
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ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people and not only 
to be the VOICE but if necessary the ARM of their discontent.”) (“But ambitious 
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explains Madison, would be a battle of political wills: “one set of representatives 
would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body 
of their common constituents on the side of the latter.”186 
This view of states as political—rather than legal—challengers to the federal 
government is confirmed by Larry Kramer’s study of constitutional enforcement 
during the Founding era. State power to control the federal government, he 
explains, existed primarily in “real politics, popular politics: the messy, ticklish 
stuff that was (and is) the essence of republicanism.”187  
Let Congress try to misuse its powers, [the Federalists] said over and 
over again, and federal lawmakers would find themselves facing 
formidable resistance from local leaders—leaders who could, and 
would, drum up outrage and opposition among the people, establish 
committees of correspondence with like-minded leaders in other states, 
and force federal lawmakers to back down through protest and 
remonstrance or by actively campaigning to oust unsatisfactory 
representatives.188  
Kramer finds the Founders’ reliance on politics unsurprising because “[t]heir 
history, their political theory, and their actual experience all taught that popular 
pressure was the only sure way to bring an unruly authority to heel.”189 In contrast 
to modern reliance on positive law and judicial review, the “Founding generation 
had a different paradigm in mind, and the idea of depending on courts to stop a 
legislature that abused its power simply never occurred to the vast majority of 
participants in the [Founding] debates.”190  
In light of this discussion, Professor Amar’s assertion that states possessed some 
measure of legal power over the federal government at the Founding is without 
sufficient evidence. He appears to be aware of much of the evidence discussed 
above and agrees that state political power was a major component of state power 
to control the federal government.191 His arguments in favor of legal power, 
however, cite no additional evidence. Instead, he simply invokes a principle of 
symmetry: if the federal government can control the states by creating a damages 
cause of action, then states can control the federal government by creating the same 
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not excite the opposition of a single state or of a few states only. They would be signals of 
general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence 
would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and 
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 186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 256 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“If therefore, 
as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the 
federal than to the state governments, the change can only result, from such manifest and 
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 187. Kramer, supra note 178, at 257. 
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 189. Id. at 266.  
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 191. See Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1500–03.  
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cause of action.192 The Tenth Amendment, Amar explains, “appears as the 
symmetrical counterpart of the enforcement clauses of the Civil War 
Amendments.”193  
The problem with this, however, is that the Tenth Amendment did not endow 
states with powers symmetrical to the federal government. It simply endowed states 
with “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”194 Where the 
federal government has the power to act, the Supremacy Clause conclusively 
elevates federal law above any law enacted by the states. The federal government 
quite clearly had the power at the Founding to enact its own cause of action against 
federal officers. It follows, therefore, that states possessed no unilateral power to 
enact converse-1983 laws.  
I now consider state power from a different perspective. Unlike in this section, 
where I considered how the Founders conceived of state power, I now turn to the 
practices cited by Professor Amar as proof of state legal power.  
B. State Power in Practice 
In defending state power to enact converse-1983 laws, Professor Amar has 
pointed to two historical practices: state common law tort suits against federal 
officers and state habeas corpus actions filed by federal prisoners. At first glance, 
the existence of these actions during the early nineteenth century would seem to 
confirm state power to enact converse-1983 laws. Upon close inspection, however, 
this view does not hold up. In this section, I first explain that the tort suits cited by 
Amar were based not on state law but rather on a general common law of officer 
liability detached from state law. Then, I explain that state habeas actions, to the 
extent they were used against federal officers in the early Republic, only existed at 
the pleasure of the federal government.  
1. Officer Suits 
The civil rights actions we know today are modern inventions. In past times, 
constitutional enforcement worked quite differently. During the nineteenth century, 
for example, constitutional rights were often enforced through ordinary tort actions. 
The 1806 case of Wise v. Withers195 is a good example. In that case, a federal 
militia officer by the name of Withers believed that Wise, a resident of Alexandria, 
Virginia, had dodged his military obligations and was thus obliged to pay a fine. 
Desiring to collect the fine, Withers, with the approval of a federal court, entered 
Wise’s home and seized his personal property. There was only one problem with 
this plan, however: Wise was actually exempt from military service. After these 
events unfolded, Wise brought a common law trespass action against Withers and 
the federal judicial officer. Finding that Wise was exempt from military service, the 
Court held that the officers’ conduct was unjustified. Without this justification, the 
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Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he court and the officer [were] all trespassers” in 
violation of state law.196 Or put differently, the Court held that the federal actors 
who violated the Constitution were subject to liability for trespass.197  
The case reporters198 and law reviews199 confirm that Wise is not an aberration. 
Where citizens suffered a constitutional violation, “[t]he predominant method of 
suing officers in the early nineteenth century was [through] an allegation of 
common law harm, particularly a physical trespass.”200 Yet cases like Wise do not, 
on their own, show that states had the unilateral power to impose liability on 
misbehaving federal officers. A close reading of these cases reveals that state law 
played a small role, or even no role at all. Instead, these cases were controlled by a 
“general common law” under the control of the federal courts.  
The concept of “general common law” (sometimes called simply “general law”) 
does not easily square with our modern sensibilities about adjudication. In modern 
times, courts are quite concerned with the source of law—that is, whether a law is 
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federal marshal); Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 285 (1816) (trespass action brought against 
revenue officer for entering dwelling and seizing goods without cause); Wilson v. 
Mackenzie, 7 Hill 95 (N.Y. 1845) (assault and battery suit brought against naval officer); 
Ward v. Henry, 19 Wis. 87 (1865) (trespass action brought against federal marshal for 
improper attachment). 
 199. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Acts, and 
the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1510 (1989) (explaining that government 
officers “were liable at common law for injuries inflicted in the course of their employment,” 
including constitutional injuries); Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 
1109, 1122–23 (1969) (noting that, in the nineteenth century, “the view developed that the 
governmental officer acting under a void statute, or outside the bounds of a valid statute, 
may be regarded as stripped of his official character, and answerable, like any private 
citizen, for conduct which, when attributable to a private citizen, would be an offense against 
person or property”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform 
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constitutional law was introduced by way of defense and reply when the officer pleaded 
justification.” Id.  
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state or federal, or common law or statutory, and so on. Adjudication worked quite 
differently at the Founding, however. “No jurist in the early nineteenth century, for 
example, seriously questioned . . . that in declaring the law judges could look to a 
variety of sources, some written and some unwritten, some foreign and some 
indigenous, some specific and some general in their nature.”201 When a rule of law 
was constructed from these multifarious sources, it was impossible to say that the 
rule was “attached to any particular sovereign.”202 Instead, the rule was simply 
understood as a general law over which the federal courts, having created the law, 
enjoyed authority over its application and development.  
General law played a prominent role in federal adjudication at the Founding. It 
applied in maritime disputes,203 commercial disputes,204 disputes involving foreign 
diplomats,205 and so on.206 This is not to say that state law never applied; it 
certainly did.207 But where a dispute concerned peculiarly federal interests, general 
law often played a significant role.  
One subject of particular interest to the federal government was the liability of 
federal officers for actions taken in the scope of their employment. Despite 
Professor Amar’s assertions that these suits were controlled by state law, I explain 
below that these suits were often controlled by general law beyond the reach of 
states. The general law in these cases manifested itself in two ways: (a) in the 
Court’s creation of immunities for federal officers; and (b) in the Court’s control 
over the merits of officer actions.  
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a. General Law in Officer Actions: Immunity  
Just as federal immunity law currently plays a significant, if not dominant, role 
in civil rights actions against federal officers,208 so too did it affect officer actions 
in the decades following the Founding. Although the scope of immunity varied 
over time, there can be no doubt that the immunity doctrine was under the control 
of the Supreme Court and played a crucial role in officer actions. 
To understand federal immunity law, a useful place to start is with Marbury v. 
Madison.209 Although famous for its jurisdictional holding, the case nonetheless 
provides insight into standard immunity law in the early nineteenth century. The 
facts of Marbury are familiar. William Marbury, believing himself to be entitled to 
a commission as a justice of the peace, sought a mandamus compelling Secretary of 
State James Madison to deliver the commission. One issue in the case was whether 
the remedy of a mandamus was the proper remedy for Marbury’s harm. The 
availability of the remedy, according to the Court, depended on whether the 
delivery of the commission was a “ministerial” or “discretionary” act. Ministerial 
acts were acts imposed by law. If a statute ordered a federal officer to take some 
specific act, and the officer failed to perform that act, a mandamus would be 
available to compel the officer to do so. In contrast, discretionary acts were simply 
“political acts” such as the “power of nominating to the Senate.”210 Political acts, 
being inherently discretionary, were not subject to a mandamus.  
In Marbury, the Court held that Marbury’s entitlement to his commission had 
already “vested,” thus providing him with a legal right, as opposed to a mere 
political interest.211 Being legally entitled to the commission, a mandamus was an 
appropriate remedy (provided, of course, the Court had jurisdiction to issue a 
mandamus). The test in Marbury was thus one of discretion: if an officer breaches a 
legal (i.e., nondiscretionary) duty, he is subject to suit. If the officer disappoints 
another through the exercise of discretion, however, the officer is “immune” from 
judicial interference.  
Discretion was thus the touchstone of immunity, and the existence of such 
discretion could be declared by Congress or by the Court. An early example of 
congressionally declared discretion involved the Embargo Act of 1808, a federal 
statute that authorized “the [federal] collectors of the customs . . . to detain any 
vessel . . . whenever in their opinions the intention [of the vessel’s captain] is to 
violate or evade any of the provisions of the [embargo] acts.”212 Just as with any 
police seizure, vessel owners would occasionally argue that the seizure was 
unjustified and pursue a common law officer action for relief. 
Several of these cases came before the Supreme Court in the second decade of 
the nineteenth century.213 Time and again, the Court held that the collectors could 
not be sued under the common law, even if the seizure was unjustified. This was 
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because the statute endowed the officers with discretion. That is, officers were 
authorized to seize ships when, in their opinion, a violation of the embargo 
occurred, regardless of whether a violation actually occurred. In the Supreme 
Court’s view, so long as the collector “honestly entertained the opinion under 
which he acted,” he was immune from suit. This was true, even if the collector’s 
opinion was “incorrect and formed hastily or without sufficient grounds.”214 “The 
law places a confidence in the opinion of the officer,” the Court explained.215 So 
long as the officer “honestly exercises” his opinion, “he cannot be punished for 
it.”216 
Where discretion was not specifically authorized by statute, the Supreme Court 
was called on to determine the scope of an officer’s discretion by virtue of his 
office. As noted above in the discussion of Marbury, the early Court applied a 
narrow definition of discretion that amounted almost to a “legality” test. That is, if 
the behavior of the officer was beyond the bounds of federal law, the federal officer 
could not claim immunity from suit. The Court applied this same rule the year after 
Marbury in Little v. Barreme.217 In that case, a federal officer seized a ship based 
on the order of the president. The president, however, did not have authority to 
order the seizure, and the owner of the ship sued the federal officer who effectuated 
the seizure. The defendant argued that, although the seizure was unjustified, he 
should escape liability because he relied in good faith upon the instructions of the 
president. Chief Justice Marshall, joined by the remainder of the Court, rejected 
this argument. The bottom line was that the seizure was unlawful, and the 
president’s “instructions cannot change th[at] nature.”218  
Marbury, Little, and other cases thus held that federal officers only possessed 
discretion—and thus immunity—when they were acting within the confines of 
federal law. That is, obedience to a valid federal law immunized the officer from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. Watkins,13 U.S. at 355–56.  
 215. Crowell, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 98.  
 216. Id. One must be careful not to overstate the importance of these cases, for it appears 
quite possible that the Court would have taken a different view in the 1860s. In 1863, 
Congress enacted a statute that immunized federal officers from personal liability for wrongs 
committed while fighting for the North in the Civil War. Act of March 3, 1863, § 4, 12 Stat. 
756. When federal officers were sued for battery or false imprisonment, they often asserted 
this statute as a defense. Two courts considered the constitutionality of the statute and 
both—a federal circuit court and the Indiana Supreme Court—found it unconstitutional. See 
Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (C.C. Ind. 1871); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 372–373 
(1863). Although the United States Supreme Court never had the opportunity to rule on the 
statute, dicta in an 1884 opinion suggests that the Court would have found the statute 
unconstitutional. See Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 640 (1889); see also David Engdahl, 
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 50 
(1972) (discussing Mitchell).  
  Despite the reasoning in these cases, it should be remembered that they came fifty to 
seventy-five years after the embargo cases discussed in the text. Thus, even if the reasoning 
in the embargo cases would not have survived in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
they are still powerful evidence of the Supreme Court’s view of officer immunity at the 
Founding.  
 217. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).  
 218. Id. at 179.  
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state law liability. It is tempting to conclude that this rule actually supports 
Professor Amar’s claims, for the rule seems to suggest that federal unconstitutional 
behavior rendered the misbehaving officer subject to a state law suit. This is true in 
a sense, but it ignores a crucial fact implicit in the decisions: immunity was a 
question of federal law over which the federal courts had exclusive control. The 
immunity law applied in Marbury, for example, bore no connection with state law. 
The Supreme Court was simply applying a general rule of immunity not “attached 
to any particular sovereign.”219  
Federal control over the law of officer immunity is proven more clearly by the 
Supreme Court’s gradual expansion of immunity during the nineteenth century. 
Decatur v. Paulding220 was an important step in this process.221 Susan Decatur, 
widow of navy hero Stephen Decatur, sought to collect two pensions after her 
husband’s death—one provided in a general pension statute and the other provided 
in specific legislation. The Secretary of the Navy, based on his own interpretation 
of the legislation, refused to issue both pensions. Mrs. Decatur sought a writ of 
mandamus ordering him to do so, but the Supreme Court refused it. As to the 
existence of a legal duty to pay both pensions, the Court explained:  
The duty required by the resolution [to pay an additional pension] was 
to be performed by [the secretary] as the head of one of the executive 
departments of government, in the ordinary discharge of his official 
duties. In general, such duties, whether imposed by act of Congress or 
by resolution, are not mere ministerial duties.222  
In the Court’s view, therefore, the secretary’s position, “as the head of one of the 
executive departments of government,” possessed an inherent discretion to decide 
whether Mrs. Decatur should receive the second pension.223 In this sense, Decatur 
was an expansion of immunity for high-ranking federal officers.224 Immunity was 
no longer controlled by the exact contours of the law but rather by an undefined 
penumbra of authority extending beyond the law itself.  
Although Decatur was a mandamus action, the Court applied the same rule in a 
damages action several years later.225 In Kendall v. Stokes, the Supreme Court was 
asked to determine whether the Postmaster General was personally liable for the 
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value of services rendered to the post office.226 In prior litigation, a court ordered 
the then-postmaster to credit the plaintiff’s account for money owed, but the 
postmaster had failed to do so. When the new Postmaster General, Amos Kendall, 
took office, he also failed to credit the plaintiffs’ account. The plaintiffs thus sued 
Kendall personally for the amount of the credits. Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Taney explained the immunity rule as such: 
 We are not aware of any case in England or in this country in which 
it has been held that a public officer, acting to the best of his judgment 
and from a sense of duty, in a matter of account with an individual, has 
been held liable to an action for an error of judgment. . . . Sometimes 
erroneous constructions of law may lead to the final rejection of a claim 
in cases where it ought to be allowed. But a public officer is not liable 
[for a decision] . . . in relation to which it is his duty to exercise 
judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his 
mistake.227  
Viewing the facts of the case, the Court held that the postmaster “committed an 
error in supposing that he had the right to set aside allowances for services 
rendered . . . . But as the case admits that he acted from a sense of public duty and 
without malice, his mistake in a matter properly belonging to the department over 
which he presided can give no cause of action against him.”228  
Kendall v. Stokes largely presages the immunity doctrine that is still in use 
today,229 though it would take the Court a half-century or more to definitively 
choose that model. Spaulding v. Vilas,230 decided in 1896, reiterates the Kendall 
rule,231 and the twentieth century cases Gregoire v. Biddle232 and Butz v. 
Economou233 carried the rule into the modern era. The precise scope of immunity, 
however, is unimportant here. It is only important for the present purposes to point 
out that the immunity of federal officers, whatever its scope, was controlled by the 
federal government, either through statute or judicial decision. There is no 
indication in the case law that the federal government was without authority to craft 
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immunity doctrine, whether it be crafted narrowly (as it was soon after the 
Founding) or more broadly (as it was in later decades). 
Against this backdrop, it cannot be maintained that nineteenth-century officer 
suits prove state power to hold federal officers liable for unconstitutional wrongs. 
To the extent federal officers were held liable under state law, this liability was 
imposed at the pleasure of the federal government. If the federal government 
withheld such permission through statute or case law, states could not have held 
federal officers liable for federal constitutional violations.  
b. General Law in Officer Actions: Merits  
Other officer actions display general law outside the immunity context. In these 
suits, the federal courts appear to be taking control of the merits of the applicable 
law and deciding the cases without regard for the content of state law.234 Take, for 
instance, Elliot v. Swartwout.235 There, a taxpayer in New York sued a federal tax 
collector in assumpsit for taxes collected in excess of the lawful rate. The collector 
defended himself by arguing that, even if the taxes exceeded the lawful rate, the 
plaintiff had paid the taxes voluntarily and without objection.236 If suits against 
federal officers were controlled by state law, one would expect the Court to 
measure this defense against New York state law. The Court, however, did 
anything but this. Instead, it searched the opinions of English courts, locating a 
“doctrine” that was “peculiarly applicable” to the case.237 The doctrine held that 
taxpayers may not sue a tax collector for “voluntary payments made by mistake.”238 
English law did not merely dominate the discussion; it was the only law cited.239 
State law was nowhere to be found. This suggests that at least some of the officer 
actions relied upon by Professor Amar were not controlled by state law but rather 
by a species of general common law. 
Elliot is by no means an outlier. In Bend v. Hoyt,240 a case involving similar 
facts, Justice Story, again, turned to English law to resolve the issue.241 After 
adducing from English law the principle that one who pays a tax without objection 
may not thereafter challenge the tax as unlawful, Story concluded: “[w]e think the 
principle a sound one, and should not hesitate to adopt it, even if there were no 
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authority to support it.”242 These are not the words of a Court that sees state law as 
authoritative; the Court quite clearly believes it has the power to adopt a particular 
rule of decision regardless of the “authority to support it.”  
What these cases illustrate is that the liability of federal officers was, in some 
cases at least, controlled completely by a body of law discovered and crafted by the 
federal courts. Although they appeared to involve routine causes of action like 
trespass or assumpsit, the dispositions of the cases did not turn on the ordinary 
common law rules connected with a particular state. Instead, these cases were 
resolved according to an undefined, but quite real, law of officer liability.  
Admittedly, Elliot and Bend are just two examples. But the analysis employed in 
the cases is entirely consistent with the views of other scholars who have studied 
officer actions. These actions were not “merely a reflection of the private law” 
affecting debts but rather evidence of a “law of government remedies” created and 
controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court.243 When these observations are combined 
with the robust evidence of federal immunity law explained in the previous section, 
there can be little doubt that federal law played a significant role in the liability of 
federal officers and that state law, if it was even involved, was subject to the 
superior force of this federal law. 
2. Habeas Corpus Actions 
In addition to citing common law officer actions as evidence of state legal power 
at the Founding, Professor Amar also cites state power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus against federal officers. “The ability of states to vindicate constitutional 
values through injunctive relief,” Amar states, “was perhaps nowhere more 
dramatic than in early state habeas corpus cases: State habeas offered a way for 
those imprisoned by federal officers in violation of their federal constitutional 
rights to win their freedom.”244  
In making this claim, Professor Amar is forced to acknowledge the 
nineteenth-century cases of Ableman v. Booth245 and Tarble’s Case,246 both of 
which hold that state courts may not issue state law writs of habeas corpus against 
federal officers. He admits that these cases refute his claims about state power, but 
argues that “the Court’s analysis in these cases was shaky, and its language quite 
sloppy.”247 Professor Amar is far from alone in his criticism of these cases.248 The 
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central criticism seems to be that the cases ignore the import of the Madisonian 
Compromise. If Congress is free not to create lower federal courts (a principle at 
the heart of the Compromise), then the only way habeas relief could be obtained 
against the federal government would be through state courts.249 But if state courts 
lack the power to issue habeas relief, and some type of habeas relief must arguably 
be available simply as a matter of due process,250 troubling questions of 
constitutional law would be presented.  
Just because Ableman and Tarble’s Case cannot be reconciled with the 
Madisonian Compromise, however, does not mean that the Constitution guarantees 
to states the power to issue writs against federal officers. There is nothing to stop 
Congress from creating federal courts and endowing them with exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters of federal law.251 Congress has done this with issues of 
intellectual property and securities law, for example, and it is certainly free to do 
the same with habeas actions against federal officers.252 Congress’s power to do so 
was clear at the Founding,253 and many commentators today believe that Ableman 
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and Tarble’s Case can be justified only if the federal habeas statute enacted in 1789 
is read to endow federal courts with exclusive habeas jurisdiction over federal 
officials.254 Whether that reading of the statute is in fact correct is unimportant 
here,255 for there is no dissent on the view that Congress, if it desired, could have 
divested state courts of their habeas jurisdiction over federal officers. Thus, state 
courts at the Founding did not possess a unilateral power to “vindicate 
constitutional values through injunctive relief.”256 Their power to vindicate federal 
rights against federal officers was subject to revision by Congress. 
Professor Amar agrees with much of this, but certainly not all of it. He agrees 
that Ableman and Tarble’s Case “can be justified only if” they are based on 
Congress’s power to vest federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction.257 Exclusive 
jurisdiction, according to Amar, will not displace the state habeas remedies against 
federal officers, however, for “federal courts would be obliged to enforce the 
vertically-pendent state law habeas remedy.”258 This assumes, however, that 
Congress lacks the power to preempt a state cause of action against a federal officer 
with a federal cause of action—something that, as discussed in Part II.D, is untrue. 
As noted above, were Congress to bar state remedies but fail to provide some other 
avenue for the vindication of constitutional rights, a constitutional problem might 
well arise.259 But there is no rule of constitutional law that prohibits Congress from 
ever touching state remedies against federal officers. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 254. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration 
Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1074 n.31 (1998) (stating that, while the Court in Tarble’s 
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rationalized more plausibly on the ground that federal statutes” implicitly created an 
exclusive federal remedy for federal prisoners); Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, 
Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1174–75 
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that habeas actions to release enlisted soldiers from the military be restricted to federal 
court.”); Redish & Woods, supra note 151, at 101 (stating that Tarble’s Case establishes a 
presumption against state-court jurisdiction in habeas cases involving federal prisoners—a 
presumption that “can be overcome only by a carefully considered, conscious decision by 
Congress”); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 
400 (2006) (“[T]he most defensible reading of Tarble’s Case is that the Court interpreted 
Congress's provision for federal court habeas jurisdiction with respect to federal petitioners 
as impliedly exclusive of state courts.”); Waxman & Morrison, supra note 16, at 2227 
(arguing that Tarble’s Case is best understood as resting upon a determination that “the 
pertinent statutes reflected an implicit congressional determination that state jurisdiction was 
not appropriate”). 
 255. Professor Todd Pettys has argued that, although Congress certainly had the authority 
to divest state courts of habeas jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress did not, in 
fact, do so. See Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 265, 297–307 (2007).  
 256. Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 15, at 1509. 
 257. Id. at 1510.  
 258. Id. 
 259. See supra notes 131–145 and accompanying text.  
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CONCLUSION  
The converse-1983 action is not a promising way for the states to check 
constitutional abuses by federal officers. The force of the action would be severely 
limited by the doctrine of Supremacy Clause immunity, and the very existence of 
the action would be contingent upon the creation of federal common law, the 
Bivens doctrine, and congressional acquiescence with the cause of action. 
Moreover, these doctrines are not misadventures of a modern Court infatuated with 
federal supremacy. Professor Amar’s arguments that the Founding generation not 
only believed that states had legal power over the federal government, but practiced 
that belief as well, are unavailing. The Federalist’s discussions of state power relied 
on by Amar pertain only to state political power, not state legal power. And the 
state causes of action he cites were either subject to general law controlled by the 
federal courts or subject to congressional override through changes in jurisdiction 
or substantive law.  
In sum, states dissatisfied with federal officers who violate the Constitution 
would be unwise to rely on a converse-1983 action. Although the action might not 
be immediately abrogated, it would always be subject to federal disapproval. This 
is hardly a reliable way to check federal constitutional abuses. 
